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Most existing renewables support schemes distort location and dispatch decisions. Many impose 
unnecessary risk on developers, increasing support costs. Efficient policy sets the right carbon price, 
supports capacity not output, ensures efficient dispatch and location. The EU bans priority dispatch 
and requires market-based bidding, but does not address the underlying problem that payment is 
conditional on generation, amplifying incentives to locate in high resource sites. This article identifies 
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but limiting the total amount of subsidy and not over-compensating high resource sites. The revenue 
assurance, with a government-backed counterparty, allows high debt:equity, dramatically lowering 
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Many impose unnecessary risk on developers, increasing support costs. Efficient 
policy sets the right carbon price, supports capacity not output, ensures efficient 
dispatch and location. The EU bans priority dispatch and requires market-based 
bidding, but does not address the underlying problem that payment is conditional on 
generation, amplifying incentives to locate in high resource sites. This article 
identifies the various distortions and proposes an auctioned contract to address 
location and dispatch distortions: a financial Contract for Difference (CfD) with hourly 
contracted volume proportional to local renewable output/MW, with a life specified in 
MWh/MW, adjusted for regional variations in correlation with total renewable output. 
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Abstract 
Most existing renewables support schemes distort location and dispatch decisions. Many 
impose unnecessary risk on developers, increasing support costs. Efficient policy sets the 
right carbon price, supports capacity not output, ensures efficient dispatch and location. The 
EU bans priority dispatch and requires market-based bidding, but does not address the 
underlying problem that payment is conditional on generation, amplifying incentives to locate 
in high resource sites. This article identifies the various distortions and proposes an auctioned 
contract to address location and dispatch distortions: a financial Contract for Difference (CfD) 
with hourly contracted volume proportional to local renewable output/MW, with a life 
specified in MWh/MW, adjusted for regional variations in correlation with total renewable 
output. This yardstick CfD delivers efficient dispatch while assuring but limiting the total 
amount of subsidy and not over-compensating high resource sites. The revenue assurance, 
with a government-backed counterparty, allows high debt:equity, dramatically lowering the 
subsidy cost.  
Keywords renewables support schemes, distortions, auctions, yardstick contracts 
1. Introduction 
Faced with a net-zero carbon target by 2050, the electricity industry will have to reach 
near zero emissions far sooner. A large part of that ambition requires a substantial increase in 
variable renewable electricity (VRE, primarily wind and solar PV). For reasons of market and 
policy failures discussed below, VRE will benefit from support. If this substantial investment 
in renewable electricity is to be delivered at least cost, support schemes need drastic redesign. 
Existing renewable electricity support schemes reflect past compromises to reconcile often 
conflicting objectives and to disentangle past unintended consequences of faulty policies.2 
While existing RE enjoys contractual commitments can continue to be honoured, their 
inefficient form can be replaced by quite different efficient policies without undermining 
policy commitment. Indeed, efficient policies are more credible as there would be no need to 
subsequently change them, encouraging, not dissuading investors. 
This article proposes an incentive-compatible efficient contract that can be auctioned 
to deliver least cost decarbonisation while maintaining control over the amount of support. It 
starts by identifying the market failures that require correction and from that considers how 
best to address them. It follows the standard public economics approach combined with 
 
1 I am indebted to David Reiner and Iain Staffell for helpful comments. 
2  See e.g. Bunn and Yusupov (2015), Klobasa et al. (2013), Nock and Baker (2017). One obvious 
conflict is between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme fixing a cap on the number of emission 
allowances, and the subsequent Renewables Directive that increased renewable targets without 
reducing the cap commensurately. The unintended result was the additional renewables had zero 
impact on EU emissions. 
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mechanism design that is relatively uncommon in energy policy.3 One reason for this 
reluctance to follow this logic is that governments are reluctant to internalise externalities by 
corrective taxes or subsidies and instead prefer targets. These targets need to be justified by 
many reasons in the hope of finding political support: environmental protection, energy 
security and job creation, many of which would not stand close economic scrutiny 
(Borenstein, 2012). That often leads writers to concentrate on the extent to which the targets 
have been met or the justifications satisfied, without enquiring into the underlying reasons for 
intervention.4 
Efficiency is neatly captured by the requirements of the EU Clean Energy Package 
(DIRECTIVE (EU) 2018/2001, §19): 
Electricity from renewable sources should be deployed at the lowest possible cost to 
consumers and taxpayers. When designing support schemes and when allocating support, 
Member States should seek to minimise the overall system cost of deployment along the 
decarbonisation pathway towards the objective of a low-carbon economy by the year 2050. 
Market-based mechanisms, such as tendering procedures, have been demonstrated to 
reduce support cost effectively in competitive markets in many circumstances. 
The Clean Energy Package requirements provide good principles that should guide 
the design of Renewable Electricity Support Schemes (RESS) in any jurisdiction. It also, 
arguably, removes on of the main impediments to efficient RESS design by dropping the 
obligation for each Member State to meet a specified renewable energy share. Such 
obligations drive countries to designs that stress RE output, not capacity, that are the root 
cause of most of the distortions discussed here. By replacing that requirement by a stress on 
designing routes to net-zero, combined with the dramatic improvement in the commercial 
viability of unsupported VRE, it opens the way to revisit the main causes of market failure 
affecting VRE, and stresses the role of markets, and hence, indirectly, market failures. Boute 
(2012, p72) notes that the Russian Ministry of Energy announced in 2012 that the national 
renewable energy target should be based on installed capacity, not energy, in line with the 
approach here. 
The lesson that well-designed auctions can dramatically reduce the cost of procuring 
renewable electricity compared to administratively fixing the strike price has been 
demonstrated by the dramatic reductions in clearing prices (Newbery, 2016a), most notably 
in successive auctions for off-shore wind in the North Sea (Grubb and Newbery, 2018). This 
article designs a contract to auction to deliver Variable Renewable Electricity (VRE) at the 
lowest possible social cost to consumers and taxpayers, including external costs and benefits. 
There is a tension between accelerating investment in renewable electricity (RE) and 
providing unnecessarily generous payments that risk excessive public cost. Price support 
schemes like Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs) that set the price and allow all entrants to claim these 
FiTs can lead to excessive public cost and rapid cancellation of the scheme, or in some cases, 
 
3 Notable exceptions include Huntingdon et al. (2017), Barquin et al.(2017) and Andor and Voss 
(2016). 
4  Thus Ragowitz and Steinhilber (2014) measure the speed of meeting the targets as their measure of 
efficacy that they contrast with efficiency, of achieving the target at least cost. Most government and 
EU reports concentrate on efficacy. 
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to retrospective withdrawal, notably in Spain (CEER, 2018). Quantity-based schemes, such 
as green certificates, can place excessive risk on developers, leading either to under-delivery 
or over-compensation, as an early article by Finon (2006) argued. The solution is simple but 
took surprisingly long to rediscover5 – auction either a fixed volume or a fixed sum of funds 
to secure the least cost solution that meets the capacity target or fits the budget. 
There is an extensive literature providing details on the various policies that have 
been implemented in different countries,6 analyses of their impacts, and proposals for 
improvements (which, however, mainly fall short of the proposal in this article).7 Rather than 
repeat surveys of that literature, this article first identifies the market failures that require 
correction. Andor and Voss (2016), drawing on Newbery (2012), demonstrate that if the only 
externality facing renewables is a learning spill-over, there is no case for subsidizing output. 
If renewables displace carbon and carbon is under-priced, and if it is not possible to set the 
correct price for carbon, then a second-best policy might be to subsidize low-carbon 
generation such as renewables (Newbery, 2018a).  
The EU also argues for investment, rather than output support as it “has the advantage 
that operating costs are in principle not affected. Moreover, it is a one-off measure which 
does not need to be readjusted at a later stage due to developments in technology or markets 
to avoid overcompensation.” (EC, 2013 §3.1.5.) In the past, however, the EU chose output 
targets for renewable energy in its various Directives. Unsurprisingly, Member States 
therefore chose output subsidies to meet these targets at least cost (Meus et al., 2021). The 
latest Directive, however, does not allocate renewable energy target shares to individual 
Member States, but instead concentrates on decarbonisation, so subsidies to output are no 
longer necessarily implied. 
This article follows other economic criticisms in supporting the changed emphasis in 
the latest EU policy as the least cost way of reaching net-zero. Özdemir et al. (2020) 
demonstrate this by comparing output and capacity support as the least-cost route to future 
RE output and carbon targets. 
The starting point of this analysis is to assume that carbon is correctly priced as there 
is an appropriate and directed instrument to address that externality. At least in the EU, the 
carbon price is now approaching the correct level – the EUA price in March 2021 was 
US$48/tonne, while World Bank (2019) argued that the 2020 Paris target-consistent price 
was at least US$40–80/tCO2. Learning externalities are the remaining motive for VRE 
support,8 sometimes described as taking account of dynamic, rather than just static efficiency. 
There are other relevant market failures that afflict liberalised electricity markets, of which 
 
5 The first RESS in the UK was an RE auction to allocate funds from the Fossil Fuel Obligation 
originally designed to finance nuclear decommissioning after the electricity industry was restructured 
for privatization (Mitchell, 2000). 
6 The Council of European Energy Regulators, CEER, provides periodic Status Reviews (of 
renewables support schemes) e.g. CEER (2018). The Congressional Research Service (2013) provides 
a detailed briefing on EU wind and solar electricity policies. See also the extensive references in 
Abrell et al., (2019). Ragwitz and Steinhilber (2012) provide a useful survey up to 2012. 
7 Meus et al. (2021) provides a useful summary of papers analysing different support schemes, and a 
comparison between leading forms of RESS. Neuhoff et al. (2018) argues that falling renewables 
costs argues for a reappraisal of their various merits and drawbacks.  
8 quantified in Newbery (2018b; 2020) 
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the most important in an industry prone to unpredictable policy interventions are missing 
futures and insurance markets (Newbery, 2016b). There are specific problems in determining 
the capacity credit of VRE and pricing curtailment that might distort free unsubsidized RE 
entry (Newbery, 2020). Such distortions are overcome by auctioning a suitably designed 
contract. 
2. Criteria for designing renewable support schemes 
Least system cost requires that new VRE locates optimally and is dispatched 
optimally. Least cost to consumers includes the (excess)9 cost of any subsidies to persuade 
VRE of the commercial case to enter. Auctions are the best way to deliver least cost 
procurement, with the added advantage of allowing control over the volumes of RE or cost of 
the RESS.10 Different technologies justify different levels of support (as they have different 
learning rates). Auctions for different technologies can be run in parallel – in Britain more 
mature technologies like on-shore wind and solar PV are allocated in a separate auction to 
off-shore wind, and the most immature technologies like wave and tidal stream have their 
own RESS auction. For auctions to work well, bidders need clarity on the future market 
design, future carbon prices and system rules or Grid Codes (including differential locational 
transmission charges) that will prevail over a reasonable fraction of the life of the investment, 
probably for at least 10 years. 
The main future sources of renewable electricity are wind and solar PV.  They have 
high capital costs but low running costs. Variable running costs for PV are zero, while for 
wind they are modest at €5-12/MWh (BEIS, 2020; NREL, 2018). It follows that the major 
cost of VRE is the cost of financing the investment – the weighted average cost of capital, 
WACC. The more predictable and certain are the costs and revenue streams after the final 
investment decision, the higher the share of debt:equity and the lower the WACC. 
VRE has another important characteristic in that its peak output is a considerable 
multiple of its average output. For wind this might be 3:1 (more if the average capacity factor 
is below 33%) and for solar PV in Northern climes, more like 10:1. At even moderate levels 
of VRE penetration there will be surplus output even allowing for export and storage. This 
excess will need to be curtailed, requiring a decision on whether, and if so how, it should be 
compensated when curtailed. This will also impact the cost to consumers and taxpayers. It 
also makes priority dispatch a potentially costly solution to encouraging VRE, and the EU 
has now banned priority dispatch for new VRE. An efficient RESS should encourage VRE to 
choose not to generate if the value of its output is less than its avoidable cost. As a partial 
remedy, some systems require that VRE only make non-negative offers. 
Finally, VRE has not only temporal, but also spatial variability, which in turn has two 
dimensions. The first is that output per MW varies considerably spatially. To demonstrate the 
importance of this, Table 1 shows the ratio of the revenue/MW secured locating a wind farm 
 
9 Above the social optimum, although as a global public good, learning externalities should largely be 
financed from general taxation. 
10 del Río (2017) draws lessons on best practice in auction design from around the world, and argues 
for clearly announcing a sequence of successive auctions to guide the development of a supply chain, 




at representative UK regional sites (defined by UKNUTS-2) compared to the UK average. 
This is calculated from the invaluable hourly dataset compiled by Iain Staffell,11 selling at 
simulated DAM prices for 2005-11 (from Green and Vasilakos, 2010) that account for the 
market impact of a high level of wind penetration. Table 1 shows the considerable but stable 
variation in the value of wind across locations and the relatively smaller variation over time 
(relative to the UK average for that year). As an example the wind output locating in K3 
(Cornwall) had a correlation with the UK average of R2 = 40% over this period.  Thus wind 
resources are systematically different in different locations, and this needs to be taken into 
account in designing supports that target capacity rather than output. 
 
Table 1 Ratio of regional annual average wind revenue/MW to the UK average, 2005-11 
  UKH1 UKJ4 UKK3 UKK4 UKM2 UKM3 UKM5 UKM6 UKN0 average SD 
2005 113.4% 92.3% 121.3% 97.1% 72.9% 80.4% 77.6% 75.4% 91.3% 91.3% 17.0% 
2006 113.1% 93.7% 117.1% 94.6% 73.2% 79.8% 75.7% 77.3% 92.2% 90.8% 16.0% 
2007 113.7% 93.2% 120.2% 97.5% 72.8% 79.2% 75.9% 74.1% 90.0% 90.7% 17.3% 
2008 109.9% 89.1% 119.2% 93.9% 75.2% 83.7% 75.8% 76.7% 93.4% 90.8% 15.4% 
2009 117.5% 95.7% 122.7% 92.4% 71.9% 77.4% 81.6% 75.7% 86.5% 91.3% 18.1% 
2010 112.7% 89.4% 117.6% 94.5% 74.1% 80.8% 78.5% 79.4% 92.8% 91.1% 15.3% 
2011 112.7% 89.4% 117.6% 94.5% 74.1% 80.8% 78.5% 79.4% 92.8% 91.1% 15.3% 
average 113.3% 91.8% 119.4% 94.9% 73.5% 80.3% 77.7% 76.9% 91.3% 91.0% 16.3% 
SD 2.2% 2.6% 2.1% 1.8% 1.1% 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 2.4% 0.3%   
Sources: https://www.renewables.ninja/country_downloads/GB/ninja_wind_country_GB_current_merra-
2_nuts-2_corrected.csv, Green and Vasilakos (2010) 
H1 is East Anglia; J4 is Kent; K3 is Cornwall; M2 is East Scotland; M3 is SW Scotland; M5 is 
Aberdeen; M6 NW Scotland, NO is N. Ireland; all peripheral locations with the highest wind in NW 
Scotland.12 
 
The second important feature of locational variation is that the correlation in output 
decreases with distance between wind farms (Elberg and Hagspiel, 2015; Wolak, 2016). 
Wind and solar PV farms have lower value if their output is highly correlated with the system 
average VRE output, as they will tend to generate when prices are depressed by excess 
wind/sun. Ideally, new entrants should locate where their output is least correlated with total 
VRE output, other factors being equal (capacity factor, transmission costs, network 
constraints). In efficient competitive markets this will be signalled by wholesale prices, even 
more strongly by zonal or locational marginal prices that better reflect transmission costs 
(Eicke et al., 2020). 
 
11 License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ - Reference: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2019.08.068  






To demonstrate the importance of this, Table 2 shows the ratio of the revenue/MWh13 
secured locating a wind farm at representative UK regional sites compared to the UK 
average. Table 2 shows the remarkably small variation in the unit value of wind across 
locations and the even smaller variation over time (relative to the UK average for that year). 
 
Table 2 Ratio of regional annual average wind revenue/MWh to the UK average, 2005-11 
  UKH1 UKJ4 UKK3 UKK4 UKM2 UKM3 UKM5 UKM6 UKN0 average SD 
2005 101.0% 101.9% 101.9% 100.2% 98.8% 98.6% 100.7% 101.1% 100.0% 100.5% 1.2% 
2006 100.1% 99.4% 100.5% 99.7% 100.1% 99.9% 101.6% 99.8% 99.5% 100.1% 0.7% 
2007 100.8% 101.4% 100.9% 101.3% 97.5% 98.8% 99.1% 98.9% 102.3% 100.1% 1.6% 
2008 100.7% 102.5% 101.6% 101.3% 97.9% 98.5% 98.0% 97.7% 99.8% 99.8% 1.8% 
2009 100.3% 101.4% 100.6% 100.0% 99.6% 99.9% 100.8% 101.3% 100.5% 100.5% 0.6% 
2010 100.0% 100.2% 100.9% 100.8% 100.1% 99.8% 100.6% 99.9% 99.6% 100.2% 0.5% 
2011 100.1% 100.3% 100.4% 99.9% 99.8% 99.9% 100.1% 100.1% 100.1% 100.1% 0.2% 
average 100.4% 101.0% 101.0% 100.5% 99.1% 99.3% 100.1% 99.8% 100.2% 100.2% 0.7% 
SD 0.4% 1.1% 0.6% 0.7% 1.1% 0.7% 1.2% 1.2% 2.4% 0.3%   
Sources: as Table 1 
 
This article identifies distortions caused by existing RESS and proposes a new 
contract that guides efficient location decisions and delivers efficient dispatch. In an efficient 
market, the real-time price of electricity should fall to the avoidable cost of marginal VRE or 
possibly below to keep flexible plant running for system stability. That should signal 
voluntary curtailment by VRE suppliers if they face the correct signals. An efficient RESS 
should balance the desirability of achieving this against the desirability of reducing risk to 
lower the WACC. 
3. Types of support schemes and their distortions 
RESS can be price-based, quantity-based, investment-based, capacity-based, or even 
regulated. Klobasa et al. (2013) distinguish five kinds of price-based RESS and one quantity-
based or quota scheme, in which the government sets a specified share of renewables in final 
consumption, and RE producers are issued certificates per MWh injected (green or 
Renewable Obligation certificates, ROCs). Meus et al. (2021) widen this list to include 
investment-based and capacity-based subsidies. Quantity-based schemes have a price 
determined by demand and supply of certificates, which may be capped by a penalty price, 
paid by retailers failing to meet their share, with the revenue recycled back to enhance the 
value of the certificates, as in the UK RO scheme. The certificate value is a premium on the 
market price, and as such it is arguably a mixture of a price and quantity instrument. Meus et 
al. (2021) ignore quantity-based schemes but include support to investment (i.e. subsidies that 
lower the installed cost) and subsidies per MW of capacity. 
Price-based schemes such as Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) can pay a fixed price over the 
contract period, or it may vary by time-of-day and/or season. For VRE the payments are on 
 
13 Table 2 measures the variation in the unit value of wind caused by a mismatch of output with 
prices. As wind penetration increases this variation should increase, so the modest variation here is an 
understatement of a high VRE penetration future. 
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metered output, often (until recently prohibited by the EU Commission) with priority access 
to the grid (and hence no need to find a buyer). Premium FiTs (PFiTs) or Feed-in Premium 
(FiP) schemes pay a premium on the market price. The premium may be fixed, or sliding, in 
which the premium makes up the difference between a reference price and a strike price, and 
again is paid on metered output. A sliding FiP may be a one-sided option, or in the British 
CfD with FiT, a two-sided obligation, reducing the upside cost to consumers (Onifade, 2016). 
Producers need to sell output on the market or to an off-taker (usually under a Power 
Purchase Agreement).14  Where ROs or green certificates are priced by demand from 
retailers, that demand share may follow a pre-announced rising level, or be increased if the 
certificate price falls below some level, or, and less predictably, if there is pressure to 
increase demand to reach renewables targets (Wyrobek et al., 2021). 
Capacity-based schemes have, as Huntingdon et al. (2017, p479) noted, the advantage 
of paying on expected, not actual performance, making wholesale electricity market prices 
guide decisions, provided their design is appropriate. Boute (2012) notes that the Russian RE 
capacity payment was contingent on reliable delivery and hence quite inappropriate for VRE. 
Investment subsidies may take the form of a possibly generous tax rebate or a straight 
subsidy as a fraction of the installation cost. Overgenerous tax breaks have been criticized for 
encouraging investment in cheap unreliable designs, notably in California (Cox et al., 1991) 
and India (Arora et al., 2010, §3.3).  Capacity subsidies can be a payment per MW 
determined by a capacity auction (typically with an obligation to be available in stress 
periods, and hence relatively risky for VRE), or unconditional (usually over a set number of 
years). As such they are directed to address the learning externality, but poor subsidy design 
can lead to cheap but inefficient choices, as claimed to be the case in the Netherlands (Meus 
et al., 2021). The choice of technology (type of wind turbine, such as height, blade length, 
and even spacing) could therefore be distorted by inappropriate RESS.  Özdemir et al. (2020) 
compare capacity and energy subsidies against the now abandoned EU requirement to deliver 
a RE output target, showing that allowing sufficient time to reap learning benefits can reduce 
the costs of achieving even a (future) output target. 
The last type of RESS is the Regulatory Asset Based (RAB) model, (although there 
are few examples of the latter for VRE, as they are more appropriate for long-lived projects 
such as nuclear power, tidal barrages and hydro-electric dams, see e.g. Newbery et al., 2019). 
Simshauser (2021) gives an interesting model for Renewable Energy Zones, which can be 
either regulated or merchant. Such zones deal with the problem that massive VRE entry on a 
weak transmission system can lead to considerable inefficiency and mistaken investment 
decisions, unless the transmission investment and VRE location are coordinated and jointly 
financed – that is, the VRE jointly pays the additional transmission investment. A RAB 
model is likely to be cheaper, but subject to regulatory delays, while merchant investment can 
respond more rapidly, and the extra financing cost might be offset by the shorter route to 
market. 
Under the RAB model, the regulator defines the RAB as the allowed cumulative 
investment, determines a depreciation schedule and an allowed WACC on the RAB, agrees 
any future investment plans, decides on the allowable operating costs, and sets a strike price 
 
14 Marketing costs might be €3/MWh, while PPAs are at a discount to expected sales value. 
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to recover the return on the RAB, its depreciation and the operating costs, for a fixed period 
(typically 5 years), before resetting these parameters at the next price control. Depreciation 
schedule implicitly defines the duration of the contract (if for a simple project, rather than a 
portfolio). Regulated asset schemes will not be considered further here. 
 
3.1. Distortions from making payment contingent on delivery 
Almost all existing price and quantity-based schemes suffer from the problem that the 
subsidized price determining the revenue (on average above the market price) is only paid if 
the VRE generates, and so the strike subsidized price, not the market price, guides location 
and dispatch decisions. The contrast with hedging instruments used for conventional 
generation is most clearly seen with the British Contract-for Difference (CfD) with FiT 
introduced by the Energy Act 2013 (HoC, 2013) that replaced the previous PFiT (with RO 
certificates). A normal CfD specifies an amount, M, (MW), a strike price, s, and a reference 
market price, p. The generator receives (or pays, if negative) (s - p).M per hour (usually 24 
hours, sometimes for 4-hr periods). As such the CfD is a purely financial contract that 
requires transfers between the parties regardless of whether the generator produces or not, 
and where the reference price is the spot market price. The generator makes its output 
decision looking purely at avoidable costs and potential revenues. If it is unprofitable to 
produce, the spot price p must be below the avoidable cost, c. It must also be below the strike 
price s so the generator receives (s - p).M. If the generator had to produce to receive its CfD 
payment it would receive the smaller amount (s - c).M per hour. It thus avoids losing c – p 
per MWh. Generators with and without CfDs will all be dispatched efficiently, based on the 
merit order of avoidable cost. 
Under the CfD with FiT in which the reference price is the spot price, the generator 
only receives the (above market) strike price if it generates, even though its avoidable cost 
may be higher than the market price, which may have been driven to very low or even 
negative levels to allow inflexible plant to avoid costly shut-downs and restarts. This could 
lead to an inefficient dispatch, exacerbated by priority dispatch. The inefficiency can be 
partly allayed by not allowing VRE to bid negative prices (in New Zealand the minimum 
offer price if $0.01/MWh). While the avoidable cost of PV is zero, the avoidable cost of wind 
is positive (perhaps €5-10/MWh). The problem remains with a simple FiT that pays the strike 
price only if the VRE generator produces (or is available and is curtailed or constrained-off 
by the System Operator, in which case the generator is paid not to produce, normally at the 
strike price). 
Unless generators make decisions based on market rather than strike prices they will 
be subject to a number of distortionary incentives in the choice of technology. Good choices 
would adapt to local conditions and choose system-friendly or advanced designs that can 
offer ancillary services but at higher cost (Meus, 2021). They would choose sites uncorrelated 
with other VRE output to avoid producing at times of depressed prices (Elberg and Hagspiel, 
2015; Grothe and Müsgens, 2013; Huntingdon et al., 2017),15 and would not over-favour high 
resource areas (discussed immediately below).  
 
 
15 E.g. by angling solar PV panels to maximize value not insolation. 
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3.2.  Locational distortions arising from fixed contract length 
Most VRE are offered a contract specified in years from commissioning, whether the 
contract is set administratively or auctioned, and whether it is a FiT, a CfD with FiT, or a 
PFiT. As the contract strike price is above the average market price (or the premium is 
positive), there is an additional incentive to locate in high wind or sunny locations, rather 
than locations that deliver the VRE at least system cost (of the investment and transmission). 
A simple example illustrates the problem, set out in Newbery (2012, p79). Suppose there is a 
windy but distant location with on average 2,500 full operating hours per year and a less 
windy but central location (close to demand centres) with 2,000 full operating hours. Suppose 
the average wholesale price is €40/MWh and the RESS provides a premium of €40/MWh on 
the market price (or the FiT has a strike price of €80/MWh). The social value of the 
electricity produced at the windy location is €40/MWh x 2,500 hrs = €100,000/MWyr and of 
the central location is €40 x 2,000 = €80,000/MWyr. Suppose that the extra system costs of 
the windy compared to the central location are €25,000/MWyr, then from a system cost 
perspective it is better to locate centrally. 
Under the RESS, however, the windy location will earn €80 x 2,500 = 
€200,000/MWyr and the central location will earn €80 x 2,000 = €160,000/MWyr, an 
advantage of €40,000/MWyr, more than sufficient to pay the extra grid charge of 
€25,000/MWyr, so the developer will prefer the windy location, leading to an inefficient 
location decision. (See also Huntingdon et al., 2017, §2.) 
While it is desirable to restrict the total subsidy paid, it is also desirable to signal that 
VRE should locate where its correlation with system-VRE is lower, and this will need to be 
taken into account when dealing with hedging risk. 
 
3.3.  Excessive costs from unhedgable risk 
The European Commission has been enthusiastic about PFiTs rather than FiTs as 
“they oblige renewable energy producers to find a seller for their production on the market 
and make sure that market signals reach the renewable energy operators through varying 
degrees of market exposure” (EC, 2013, 3.1.3). Later the EC recognised that a sliding FIP has 
“the disadvantage of partly shielding the beneficiary from price signals, but from the investor 
perspective this may be precisely what allows the investment to take place at a reasonable 
cost of capital.” Neuhoff et al. (2017) point out that the normal sliding FiP is a one-sided 
option, allowing the generator to be paid the strike price if the market price is below the strike 
price, but paying the market price if above. With falling RE costs, this overcompensates RE, 
and is better replaced by the UK CfD with FiT that is a two-sided obligation. 
The key lesson from the PFiTs, and especially under the UK RO scheme, compared 
with FiTs was that the WACC needed to persuade entrants was considerably higher, perhaps 
3% real higher (Newbery, 2016). The uncertainty can be broken down into two parts, 
exposure to market price risk, which is common to all generators (at least, if they are not 
vertically integrated into retailing), and risk about the future level of subsidies. The value of 
ROCs and green certificates depend on future demand and supply, and are hard to predict 
(and might even be cancelled as happened in Spain). Figure 1 shows the variability of the two 
elements, lower for the ROC price as they are underwritten to some extent by a pre-
10 
 
announced expanding demand in line with forecast VRE supply. 
 
Figure 1 UK wholesale prices (RPD) and the Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) prices 
Source: UKRPD and Ofgem 
This double jeopardy explains why the UK replaced the RO scheme with CfDs with 
FiTs. The risk arising from the variability of the RO price of the premium can be addressed 
by fixing the premium, which is problematic if the premium is administratively set and slow 
to adapt to changing market and cost conditions. Faced with the excessive payments as VRE 
costs fell, some countries (Germany) specified a rate of decrease of the premium (or it that 
case the strike price), but the simplest solution is to hold periodic auctions to determine the 
market clearing premium (or indeed strike price). 
The normal argument for confronting all generators, conventional and VRE, with 
market risks is that it creates a so-called level playing field, placing risk upon those best able 
to manage it (through, in particular, hedging arrangements or Power Purchase Agreements, 
PPAs). The short answer is that VRE faces rather different market risks than fossil 
generation. In markets with a modest share of VRE, fossil generators set the market-clearing 
price most of the time. They are naturally hedged as wholesale prices follow fuel prices 
(Roques et al., 2008), while zero-carbon generation will be exposed to the very considerable 
fuel price risk. Figure 2 shows UK forward prices for electricity, gas and coal costs 
(including the EU carbon price) in lock-step for delivery in 2010 over the period in which 
forward markets quoted prices for annual 2020 contracts. The fossil generation profit 
(difference between electricity price and fuel cost) is considerably more stable than the 
electricity price that is the major determinant of VRE profit. 
Arguably, VRE producers could also hedge in the fuel markets, but only for a limited 
future period, although they can (and do) sell under a long-term contract to an integrated 
utility better placed to hedge (including a hedge against lower prices caused by high VRE 
penetration). 
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Figure 2 Forward prices for UK base-load 2010 contracts 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
So why not offer conventional CfDs to VRE in the RESS with contracted output M 
set equal to the θK, where K is its capacity, and θ is its capacity factor (i.e. the fraction of its 
average output to that if it delivered K MWh each hour)?  With a purely financial CfD, 
generators would choose not to generate if the market price falls below avoidable cost. If the 
wind or sun were strong, it would only be partly compensated, and would sell the surplus at 
the market price (likely depressed by high wind and/or sun). In addition, VRE cannot choose 
to generate its contracted amount if the resource (wind or sun) is not sufficiently strong, and 
under a conventional CfD the VRE would be liable to lose (s – p)M or even, if p is high, to 
pay (p – s).M. That is the obvious reason why the CfD is on metered, not contracted, output.  
The reference price p could be set at e.g. the monthly average of the Day-ahead 
hourly prices, which will be below high prices that risk the VRE having to make payments. A 
sliding FiP or CfD with FiT would stabilise the revenue of the VRE (at s – p*) where p* is 
the (averaged and more stable) reference price. Unless prevented, the VRE will still be 
willing to offer to generate at any spot price above c - (s – p*), which could be quite large and 
negative. Again, this can be avoided by ensuring a minimum offer price and removing 
priority dispatch. 
The only long-term hedging open to VRE is to sign a PPA with a fossil generator (or 
retailer), as they may value the hedge against the downward pressure on wholesale prices 
caused by massive VRE entry (amply demonstrated for Europe by Hirth, 2018). Bunn and 
Yusupov (2015) argue that this is a reason for retaining PFiTs (specifically the RO scheme) 
rather than moving to fixed strike prices, and that argument may have increasing force as the 
share of VRE begins to dominate price determination. After the 2011 market reform in 
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Britain, the shift to fixing the strike price (or delinking it from major movements in the 
wholesale price) clearly lowered financing costs, as argued above (Newbery, 2016a). 
 
4. Avoiding RESS distortions by an incentive-compatible volume CfD 
In what follows we assume that carbon is properly priced, that wholesale markets are 
workably competitive (as they are at least in Britain), and that grid charges for connection 
and use are correctly set, as discussed in detail in Brunekreeft et al. (2005) and surveyed in 
Eicke et al. (2020). A CfD with FiT reduces market risk and that should lower the finance 
cost. Auctions discover the lowest premium able to attract investors. But the distortions 
remain if the generator only receives the (above market) strike price if it generates, and if its 
duration is time limited. The solution proposed here addresses each of these drawbacks.  
The first requirement is to ensure that VRE always bids its avoidable cost and hence 
ensures efficient dispatch. Höckner et al. (2020) recognise this is a problem in the German 
market when addressing congestion and the need to redispatch to resolve the constraint, but 
instead of calling for a redesign of the support scheme, argue for side payments to offset the 
distortion of treating the support price, not the market price, as the opportunity cost. Höfer 
and Madlener (2021) quantify the resulting constraint costs. EC (2013, §3.1.5) accepts that 
investment rather than output support avoids affecting operating costs are in principle not 
affected but does spell out how this support is best delivered, nor does it argue against the 
various support schemes widely deployed except insofar as they distort competition and 
trade. The most recent Renewable Energy Directive ((EU) 2018/2001) rules out priority 
dispatch and argues for market-based mechanisms, but again does not address the distortions 
identified here. IEA’s 20 Renewable Energy Policy Recommendations is more concerned 
with distortions from fossil fuel subsidies16 but has a section on RE in which it argues to 
“Recognize (e.g. through differentiated tariff levels) the different locational, time and 
technological value of the renewable power plants and decentralised installations (IEA, 2018, 
recommendation 12). 
Capacity subsidies do have this property, if properly defined to ensure that the right 
technology is installed. Boute (2012) noted that they were favoured in Russia, but there 
treated in the same way as other capacity procured to deliver the reliability standard. 
However, by themselves, they still leave market risk with the capacity holder, with the same 
disadvantages noted above of the lack of suitable hedges. To preserve the hedging advantages 
while providing incentives for efficient dispatch, the alternative is to make its contracted 
output Mh in hour h equal to θrhK, where K is its capacity, θrh is the average capacity factor 
for wind in region r in hour h. This could be based on the best relevant wind forecast, which, 
given that the wind farm has to sell in the market (or its agent has to sell on its behalf) would 
be the likely amount sold in any case. The following proposition demonstrates that the wind 
farm will be dispatched (and constrained down) efficiently.17 
 
 
16 Such as the 15% subsidy to electricity and gas in the UK resulting from preferential VAT rates. 
17 This contact design is also closely related to the incentive effects of benchmarking on a regulated 
firm’s performance (Shleifer, 1985). 
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Proposition 1. A yardstick CfD which pays (s – ph)θrhK in hour h in region r, regardless of 
whether generating or not will ensure efficient dispatch and constraint management. In the 
formula K is its capacity, θrh is the average capacity factor for wind in region r in hour h. 
 
Proof. Efficiency requires that the wind farm (subscript w) will offer at its avoidable cost, c, in 
the day-ahead auction and into the balancing market for constrained down actions. Suppose 
that ph > c and the wind farm offers C > c. If C > ph, then the wind farm will not generate and 
will receive (s – ph)θrhK, compared to receiving (s – ph)θrhK + (ph – c)θwhK, where θwhK is the 
day-ahead forecast output of the wind farm and thus the offer into the wholesale day-ahead 
market. Provided θrh – θwh is small (which is equivalent to choosing an appropriate sized and 
located region r) the first term is larger, and similarly if C < c > ph >C there is a risk of 
generating and losing (c – ph)θwhK. Bidding according to the true avoidable cost is a dominant 
strategy, at least for a price-taking generator. 
 
Conclusion 1  A yardstick CfD for VRE in which the volume contracted each hour is 
proportional to the area-wide VRE-specific output/MW encourages efficient bidding 
for dispatch while preserving stable revenue streams needed for low-cost finance.  
 
The same idea has been proposed in Spain. Barquín et al. (2017) cites the Spanish 
Royal Decree 413/2014) that adjusted the required capacity support by a standard production 
for each technology (e.g. 1,600 hours/year for PV and 2,100 hours/year for wind). This would 
need to be paid for a pre-determined number of years to ensure adequate performance. 
Huntingdon et al. (2017, p479) builds on this idea of a reference plant to provide the 
benchmark, arguing that it encourages developers to try and beat the benchmark plant, which 
would therefore have to be updated, and might risk local saturation. An area-wide wind 
forecast would seem to have advantages in being ex-ante, not ex-post, and hence able to 
encourage other aspects of efficient dispatch, such as providing balancing (down) and other 
ancillary services 
While this contract may make little difference for congestion management (at least if 
there are sufficient conventional plant able to reduce output) and given that a zero lower 
bound of acceptable bids is a simpler solution, the proposition will be more useful in 
combination with other minor changes to contract design when it comes to the more 
important location distortions. 
However, while this contract (or a zero bid constraint) addresses the problem if VRE 
needs to sell in the wholesale market (as with PFiTs and as required in future under the EU 
Clean Energy Package) it does not deal with simple legacy FiTs, which guarantee payment 
on injection. As FiTs are usually linked to priority dispatch, that means unless curtailed they 
will always supply and could drive the market price below zero. As noted, this evident 
distortion has been addressed in the Clean Energy Package that disallows priority dispatch 
for new RESS contracts. It is open for regulators to offer those with priority dispatch 
contracts an adequately attractive alternative contract that overcomes this limitation where it 
is causing serious distortions. As there are efficiency gains to be reaped, it is possible to offer 
a new contract that makes both parties better off. 
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The UK Government had to set up a Government-owned CfD Counterparty to 
reassure investors that their revenue under the CfD with FiT contracts was guaranteed by a 
credible counterparty. Contracts also need to specify that the payments would not be taxed or 
limited by future Government interventions. The same would be required for this yardstick 
CfD to provide credible and bankable revenue assurance. 
 
4.1 Constraints and Curtailment 
As VRE has a high ratio of peak to average power, and as penetration increases, so 
transmission constraints and system-wide curtailment will become necessary. Local 
transmission constraints require generation behind the constraint to reduce output and to be 
replaced by increased generation elsewhere. System-wide curtailment is necessary when 
there is more VRE than the system can absorb while maintaining stability. In the island of 
Ireland in 2019 4% of VRE was constrained off and 3.7% was curtailed (Eirgrid, 2020).  
Constraints are normally addressed by non-energy balancing actions, in which 
generators indicate how much they will accept to be constrained down, and under the Clean 
Energy Package Regulation 2019/943 (Art 13.1) new controllable renewables are to be 
treated in the same way as conventional generation:  
The redispatching of generation and redispatching of demand response shall be based on 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. It shall be open to all generation 
technologies, all energy storage and all demand response, including those located in other 
Member States unless technically not feasible. 
Redispatched units are to be financially compensated, and the normal practice is for 
this to be their lost profit, which is signalled by their bid to decrease output. For an 
unsubsidized generator if the market price is p and its avoidable cost is c, they should be 
happy to be paid p - c per MWh for their output to be reduced, although they may bid a sum 
exceeding p and risk not being constrained.18 The problem with subsidized generation is that 
their lost profit may be distorted by the subsidy, and may lead to an inefficient choice of units 
to constrain down, as discussed above. If, as seems sensible for many reasons, VRE is 
prohibited from negative bids, compensation would be limited to their strike price (or the 
premium plus market price), and is equivalent to the standard practice of offering firm 
connection rights to all generation. In congested areas offering non-firm connection offers to 
new entrants until cost-effective reinforcement relaxes the export constraint would remove 
the need to compensate those entrants, and would provide a good locational signal. This is 
consistent with REGULATION (EU) 2019/943 Art 13(7):  
Where non-market based redispatching is used, it shall be subject to financial compensation 
by the system operator requesting the redispatching to the operator of the redispatched 
generation, energy storage or demand response facility except in the case of producers that 
 
18 They may argue that the cost of restoring output after a reduction is considerable, or they may have 
other commitments (e.g. to deliver heat as well as electricity), or they may believe they can exploit 
their market power if there are few other alternatives open to the System Operator. Normally there 
will be rules limiting the exercise of market power. 
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have accepted a connection agreement under which there is no guarantee of firm delivery of 
energy.  
The volume contract set out below is attractive in that if the connection agreement is non-
firm, the VRE will be almost completely compensated by future equivalent revenue, which 
should be reflected in lower bids in the auction, even if curtailment does not provide 
immediate compensation.  
In contrast to redispatch to deal with constraints, the extent of curtailment will depend 
on the size of the system (small islands will experience highly correlated VRE output that 
will be attenuated across Continental synchronised systems), its flexibility, size of 
interconnection and its storage capacity (MarEI, 2020). However, beyond some level of 
penetration the cost of avoiding curtailment will exceed its value, and curtailment will 
become necessary. VRE with efficient yardstick contracts should choose to self-curtail, at 
least if the market price falls to the avoidable cost of the only remaining generation capable 
of reducing output (VRE, as all other units are at their minimum levels to ensure system 
stability). Curtailed VRE would need assured compensation, which will depend on the form 
of contract, as considered below. 
 
4.2 Locational distortions 
The yardstick contract addresses the problem of providing hedging while preserving 
spot market incentives, but by itself if does not remove the two forms of locational distortion. 
The first, of over-rewarding high resource areas (as illustrated in Table 1) that may also have 
higher system costs, is simply addressed. It can be avoided by limiting the length of the 
contract not by time but by the number of full operating hours (e.g. 30,000 MWh/MW 
capacity).19 That way the undiscounted total subsidy paid would be independent of location, 
although the discounted sum would be slightly higher in windy locations. Thus if the subsidy 
is indexed and the real discount rate is 3.5%, the central location would be worth 5% less 
than the windy location. If the subsidy is not indexed, and the discount rate is 6% nominal, 
then the extra value of the windy location is 8%, still not appreciable. Not indexing seems 
preferable as it front-end loads repayments and better reflects technical progress lowering 
future VRE costs. In addition, commercial finance and certainly the tax system are almost 
entirely nominal, further arguing for not index linking. 
An alternative that avoids deferring compensation to the end of the contract is to set 
an annual limit (or one set over 2-5 years to handle annual variability). This is similar to the 
Spanish Royal Decree 413/2014 that was designed to pay the capacity support by a number 
of full operating hours per year (e.g. 2,100 hours for wind, Barquín et al., 2017).  
The main remaining problem is that almost completely hedging output risk with the 
yardstick CfD of Proposition 1 does not address the second locational distortion, of blunting 
the incentive to locate in areas and/or choose designs (e.g. optimized to local wind speeds) 
that minimise correlations with the same generic category (wind, PV). Paying the market 
price when actually generating would encourage locating where the resource delivers in 
higher priced hours (when the system is not saturated with wind or PV), but this requires a 
suitable hedge.  
 
19 Steinhilber (2016) notes that this specification is used in China. 
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The idea here is to preserve the market price signal to locate while both hedging the 
market price risk and relating the subsidy to capacity, not output. One solution is again to 
make use of reference locations as before. Consider wind, and suppose the system average 
wind output per MW in hour h is θSh when the system average price is ph, so that the system 
average wind revenue is ∑h θShph/MW in that period (month, season, year). The 
corresponding revenue for a representative wind farm in region r is ∑h θrhph/MW. If in 
addition to the previously determined CfD revenue, the wind farm received (or paid if 
negative) the period sum ∑h (θrh – θSh)ph/MW then the incentive to locate where most 
valuable is restored, once the total number of full operating hours is limited. Settlement 
would be after the data were collected and validated (much as happens in daily auction 
markets to determine the wholesale price) and could be paid monthly in arrears. 
This can be combined with the yardstick CfD of Proposition 1, together with a 
volume limited number of full operating hours, either in total, e.g. 30,000MWh/MW, or for 
sub-periods of several years, e.g. 9,000MWh/MW over 5 years, up to 15 years in total. This 
removes the incentive to locate in regions of high resource while retaining the incentive to 
locate where the local resource has a lower correlation with the country average. 
 
Proposition 2. Setting the strike price s in the yardstick CfD as defined in Proposition 1 but 
adding (or subtracting if negative) the period sum ∑h (θrh – θSh)ph/MW (where θSh is the 
system-wide capacity factor, θrh is the capacity factor in local region r, and ph is the hourly 
wholesale price) for a limited number of full operating hours, would induce efficient location 
while providing strong revenue assurance. 
 
Proof. The strike price and revenue paid do not depend on generator w’s actual hourly output, 
θwhK, but are correlated with it, providing a partial hedge, and encouraging a location that 
maximizes ∑h (θrh – θSh)ph less transmission charges. The volume limit removes the incentive 
to locate solely because of high capacity factors, while preserving the incentive to locate 
where there is low correlation with the system average.  
 
The quality of the hedge could be tested using the very useful UKNUTS-2 hourly 
dataset illustrated in Tables 1 and 2, but the variation is rather small, so the Appendix 
provides an exaggerated example to make the case. This volume-defined contract combined 
with the efficient yardstick contract would be particularly advantageous in handling self-
curtailment when prices fall below avoidable cost, in that there would be little loss (in present 
value terms) of not generating, as that would not impact total subsidy payments. 
 
Conclusion 2  To discourage RESS from distorting location decisions and market prices, 
negative offers should be prohibited and the length of the contract should be 
specified in numbers of full operating hours (MWh/MW capacity). This can be 
combined with a yardstick VRE to provide revenue assurance. 
For locations where export limits are likely to lead to persistent constraints, the 
auction contract should be quite clear that the connection agreement is non-firm. When 
combined with volume-limited contracts compensation would take the form of deferred 
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revenue. While this is slightly worse than immediate compensation it avoids the problem of 
defining the avoidable cost to determine the lost profit. For firm connections that problem can 
perhaps best be avoided by specifying a minimum acceptable bid for the technology type of 
VRE, perhaps pitched slightly above the technology-specific avoidable cost to encourage 
self-curtailment and deferred payment under the volume-limited contract.  
The contract could be further defined by making curtailment first-in last out, rather 
than as in most schemes, equi-proportional curtailment. The defence of this discriminatory 
curtailment scheme is that at each auction, bidders can estimate the current level of 
curtailment, and may base their bids on assuming that this rate will continue. Further entry is 
likely to exacerbate curtailment until reinforcement arrives. Simshauser (2021) gives graphic 
evidence that poor foresight of future constraints (in this case, taking the form of increasing 
transmission loss factors) can lead to inefficient location decisions and financially costly 
outcomes that will feed back into future RESS auction bids. 
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Most existing renewables support schemes distort location and dispatch decisions, of 
which by far the more significant are locational distortions, as these persist for the life of the 
investment. Many support schemes impose unnecessary risk on developers, leading to more 
costly finance and higher required support payments. Provided carbon is properly priced, the 
efficient form of support should be to capacity, not output (except insofar as ensuring that the 
installation is capable of an efficient operating life). It should also preserve an efficient merit 
order against conventional generation. The EU’s Clean Energy Package goes some way to 
addressing some of the dispatch distortions by banning priority dispatch and requiring 
market-based bidding for redispatch, but does not address the underlying problem of making 
payment of the subsidy conditional on generation. That amplifies the incentive to locate in 
higher system cost sites with a higher resource (wind or sun) and has resulted in massive 
induced (and probably unnecessary) transmission investments in some jurisdictions, such as 
the undersea DC cables to bring wind from Scotland to England. 
This article identifies the source of the distortions and proposes a novel contract to 
address both location and dispatch distortions. It argues for a purely financial Contract for 
Difference (CfD) in which the contracted volume in any hour is proportional (and roughly 
equal) to the technology-specific area output per MW capacity, with a life specified in 
MWh/MW capacity (e.g. 30,000 full operating hours). If the strike price in the CfD is set by 
the difference between the average wind/PV revenue per MWh and the spot price, this 
yardstick volume-limited CfD preserves the same efficient dispatch incentives of normal 
CfDs widely used by conventional generators, while assuring but limiting the total amount of 
subsidy, and still providing incentives to locate in sites with a low correlation with average 
wind/PV output, while avoiding incentives to locate solely because of a high resource. The 
revenue assurance, which will need a government-backed counterparty, enables investment to 
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Appendix Testing the hedging properties of the volume-limited yardstick CfD 
 
Table A1 demonstrates the claims of Propositions 1 and 2. The strike price s is £60/MWh, the 
system average is S, the reference region is r, and the wind farm is w. The price is p and the 
capacity factor at w is a slight disturbance from the region average. The wind farm has a 
contracted output in each hour of region r, and sells is actual output at the wholesale price, p 
so its revenue is made up of the CfD revenue (s-p)*r, its market sales value (shown in the 
column w*p) and periodically (here at the end of the year) the locational adjustment of 
£1,120, which is the difference over the whole contract period of the revenue at the reference 
region, £1,960 less the system average revenue, £840. The contract period is the same 
number of MWh, 42/MW, but the contract length in time is 15 years for the system average 
but only 11.7 years in region r with higher wind on average (and a very low correlation with 
the system average – compare cols S and r).  
 
Table 1 
      Output MWh/MW revenue at market prices/MW CfD/MW total revenue/MW 
  p/MWh 
(s-p) 
/MWh S r w r-S S*p r*p w*p (r-S)*p (s-p)*r r w 
  £70 -£10 0 0.8 0.75 0.8 £0.0 £56.0 £52.5 £56.0 -£8.0 £48.0 £44.5 
  £60 £0 0.1 0.7 0.75 0.6 £6.0 £42.0 £45.0 £36.0 £0.0 £42.0 £45.0 
  £50 £10 0.2 0.6 0.55 0.4 £10.0 £30.0 £27.5 £20.0 £6.0 £36.0 £33.5 
  £40 £20 0.3 0.5 0.55 0.2 £12.0 £20.0 £22.0 £8.0 £10.0 £30.0 £32.0 
  £30 £30 0.4 0.4 0.35 0 £12.0 £12.0 £10.5 £0.0 £12.0 £24.0 £22.5 
  £20 £40 0.5 0.3 0.35 -0.2 £10.0 £6.0 £7.0 -£4.0 £12.0 £18.0 £19.0 
  £10 £50 0.6 0.2 0.15 -0.4 £6.0 £2.0 £1.5 -£4.0 £10.0 £12.0 £11.5 
  £0 £60 0.7 0.1 0.15 -0.6 £0.0 £0.0 £0.0 £0.0 £6.0 £6.0 £6.0 
average £35 £25 0.35 0.45 0.45 0.1 £7.0 £21.0 £20.8 £14.0 £6.0 £27.0 £26.8 
per MWh          £20.0 £46.7 £46.1 £140.0   £60.0 £59.4 
Total      2.8 3.6 3.6 0.8 £56.0 £168.0 £166.0 £112.0 £48.0 £216.0 £214.0 
total MWh per contract 42 42 42                 
length of contract  15.0 11.7 11.7   15.0 11.7 11.7        
revenue over contract       £840 £1,960 £1,937    £2,520 £2,497 
plus locational differential             £3,640 £3,617 
locational differential           £1,120 £1,097     £1,120 £1,120 
Note: s = £60/MWh 
Note that the wind farm earns slightly less than the representative regional farm, but the 
locational differential is (by design) the same as at the regional level. 
